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I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Professor Shiller’s pa-
per on the role of psychology in housing markets. 
It is common to read in the papers about how the collapse of the 
housing bubble has led to a crisis in debt markets, caused the stock 
market to fall and LBO activity to stop on a dime. Having begun my 
career at the Boston Fed in the early 1990s, let me say that what we 
have seen so far is nothing compared to the fall in house prices in New 
England or California at that time and certainly not nearly as bad as 
things were in the oil belt in the late 1980s.
House prices are now under pressure for two reasons: 1) the his-
toric decline in long-term real interest rates has been followed by a 
steady rise in real rates, at least until recently, and, 2) credit market 
imperfections that first led to excessive lending in some key housing 
markets have been followed recently by a sharp pullback of credit. 
In a few other places, poor local economic conditions have also 
played a role. Interestingly, foreclosures and house price weakness 
first developed in Ohio and Michigan, even though these states did 
not see the enormous house price appreciation that occurred in other 
parts of the country. 
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Professor Shiller presents a very stark perspective on the signifi-
cant role of psychology in driving real estate booms. While I agree 
that psychology may play a role in housing appreciation, especially in 
markets where small investors predominate, I believe that Professor 
Shiller has overstated the case.
First, let me first comment on the use of the term “fundamentals” 
in the paper. Professor Shiller almost ignores the role of interest rates 
in explaining the recent housing boom. He notes the unprecedented 
correlation in house price growth rates in the U.S. and countries 
around the world. Yet the paper ignores the most common economic 
factor across all of these markets: low interest rates driven by a global 
glut in liquidity. Frankly, I would have been shocked if we had not 
seen a global real estate boom given the enormous decline in long-
term real interest rates and the decline in the price of risk.
Consistent with the interest rate hypothesis, the slowdown in the 
U.S. housing market corresponds to the time that long-term real in-
terest rates started rising off their trough in 2005. By early 2006, as 
mortgage rates rose, existing home sales started falling, as did new 
construction, followed shortly by a fall in median prices. 
Professor Shiller’s example of the British housing market downturn 
in 2004 may have inadvertently reinforced the link between interest 
rates and house prices. So why did higher short-term interest rates 
seem to have a big effect in the U.K., but a more pronounced tight-
ening in the U.S. did not result in a housing slowdown here?  The 
answer may be mostly institutional. British mortgages are typically 
much shorter duration, so increases in the short rate would have had 
a much stronger effect on housing demand there than it did in the 
U.S., where we have predominantly fixed-rate mortgages. 
Professor Shiller has not just capriciously ignored the role of inter-
est rates. Instead, he cites evidence that U.S. house prices are uncor-
related with interest rates, using data that goes back to the 1880s. 
Aside from the data problems in combining so many series over 
long periods of time, this is a tough comparison. During most of 
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were relatively unimportant. It is only after WWII when the modern 
economy and suburbanization developed and modern mortgages be-
came increasingly available.
I was also surprised to see that Professor Shiller considers the post-
war boom in suburban housing construction to be due to a social 
epidemic. Most economic historians attribute the early 1950s house 
construction boom to structural economic changes and the huge in-
crease in lending due to government-backed VA loans.
I have examined postwar U.S. housing markets with co-authors 
Joseph Gyourko and Todd Sinai in a paper titled “Superstar Cities.”   
We document that house prices have consistently grown faster in 
cities such as San Francisco, L.A., New York, Boston and Seattle for 
more than five decades. We label these places superstar cities. Our 
research attributes this fast appreciation to a combination of scarce 
land, steady population increases and strong income growth by the 
highest earners who predominantly live in these superstar cities. 
In the following charts, I have separated U.S. housing markets 
into three categories. The first group, labeled “Cyclical Markets,” 
is composed of several superstar cities, and exhibits a strong boom/
bust pattern. As Charlie Himmelberg, Todd Sinai and I argued in a 
recent article, higher expected appreciation might cause these super-
star cities to exhibit excess volatility relative to slower price-growth 
markets. We compare the exaggerated volatility in superstar cities to 
that of high price earnings ratio stocks or long-duration, low-yielding 
bonds. This effect is exacerbated as long-term interest rates fall. It is 
not necessary to rely on behavioral economics to explain this pattern 
of increased volatility.
The second group, labeled “Steady Markets,” has seen little real 
house price appreciation, except in the last decade as real interest 
rates fell. Given that land to build has been easily available, house 
prices appear to be driven primarily by construction costs and local 
demand. If one is going to have a story of irrational exuberance, it is 
important to explain why some markets are exuberant, while other 
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Clearly, house prices in some markets have gotten way out of line 
with fundamentals. The third category, “Recent Boomers,” looks 
much more like the markets that Professor Shiller describes in his 
paper. All of you know where they are: Phoenix, Las Vegas, much 
of southern Florida and parts of southern California. House prices 
in these bubble markets grew at rates well above historical norms 
even as developers built many more units than could be sustained by 
reasonable growth in demand. These markets were fueled by a lethal 
mix of easy capital through the subprime market and small investors 
who wanted to flip houses for quick profits.
This leads me to my second key point: I believe that debt market 
excesses are also much more important than Professor Shiller alludes 
to in his paper. Richard Peach, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery from 
the New York Fed have documented a strong correlation between 
excess housing production, increases in median house prices and the 
growth in the use of subprime mortgages. 
So that begs the question: Why did debt markets get into so much 
trouble?  It is tempting to argue that the housing bubble caused the 
debt crisis, but I believe the opposite was true. While causality is very 
hard to establish and will undoubtedly be the subject of many future 
studies, let me provide a couple of facts that support the claim that 
it is really debt market problems that led to mispricing of houses in 
some key markets.
As Bill White highlighted, the growth of securitization and CDOs 
was not limited to the housing market. It also led to a boom in corpo-
rate LBOs and an enormous growth in commercial real estate prices. 
Despite all of the claims about the great efficiencies in securitization, 
we are starting to learn many of the accompanying pitfalls. While 
Chairman Bernanke referred to conflicts associated with free-standing   
originators  selling  loans  to  not-fully  informed  investors,  material   
conflicts also exist between various groups of investors. And, as we 
may see in the years ahead, servicers may not have the incentives or 
flexibility to manage the renegotiation and foreclosure process in a 
way that maximizes the economic value between the borrower and 
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CDOs just exacerbate the problems of ABS, adding another layer of 
conflicts and lots of leverage to already highly leveraged debt instru-
ments. In addition, CDO managers started to combine various types of 
debt to get greater diversification, ultimately buying leveraged products 
that they did not fully understand. History is replete with examples of 
new and innovative financial products that are really just an opportu-
nity to add excessive leverage in the name of financial efficiency.
Next, let’s look at the link between debt markets and house prices. 
In the last three charts, I examine the ratio of the annual cost of 
owning a house with the rental cost for the three groups of cities. 
The solid line at one represents the 27-year average of this ratio for 
each city. The methodology is based on my work with Himmelberg 
and Sinai. The programs and data are available on my website, where 
the data are updated on a quarterly basis. The latest data point on 
the right is the current ratio of the cost of owning to renting from 
the first quarter of this year. A value above one represents a time that 
house prices are relatively expensive compared to renting. 
The states with the highest growth in subprime usage (as document-
ed by Peach, Tracy and Vickrey), Nevada, Arizona, Florida, and Cali-
fornia, are the same states where the annual cost of housing has gotten 
far above rental values. However, counter to the irrational exuberance 
theory, other high-appreciation rate states like New York, Connecticut, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts were not big users of subprime debt and 
also do not appear to be grossly overpriced using our methodology. 
Predictions from the nascent housing futures market show a similar 
pattern of further weakening prices in the overpriced markets like Mi-
ami and Las Vegas, but somewhat stabilizing house prices in Boston 
and New York.
So what do I conclude?  I think Professor Shiller has overstated his 
argument that psychology has played the predominant role in caus-
ing house price bubbles to appear. While psychology is important, 
economic  fundamentals,  particularly  long-term  interest  rates  and 
housing supply constraints, seem to matter more. Similarly, credit 
market excesses appear to have played a very important role in the 
places where prices got ahead of fundamentals. While causality is hard 130  Christopher J. Mayer
to demonstrate, it would be quite a coincidence if housing caused the 
debt market excesses that occurred simultaneously for corporate LBOs 
and commercial real estate.
This does not mean that psychology does not matter at all. The 
tendency for some borrowers to use too much of that cheap and 
easy debt may well have been related to their assumption that house 
prices would grow and quickly bail them out. An interesting but 
unanswered question is why excessive lending practices appear to 
have driven prices ever higher in some markets, but not others. It 
is quite possible that the involvement of small investors in places 
like Miami and Las Vegas were strong contributors to the housing 
excesses. Small investors appear to have played a similar role in the 
Tech Boom. Finally, the Land Boom described by Professor Shiller 
may also be due to the tendency of investors, particularly foreign 
investors, to overstate expected appreciation in markets they do not 
fully understand. The same thing also occurred in commercial real 
estate in the late 1980s.
Finally, I agree with Professor Shiller that monetary policy may not 
be able to do much to help the housing market today, although for 
different reasons. My empirical work shows that long-term interest 
rates are what matter most for U.S. house prices. Discount rate cuts 
are unlikely to spur the housing demand much, even as the increase 
in rates from 2003-2005 did little to deter house prices from rising.
While I would normally be optimistic for housing prices given the 
recent decline in long-term rates, this positive effect has been more 
than offset by a sharp reduction in mortgage lending almost across the 
board. Most ominously, spreads on relatively-safe prime mortgages 
have spiked by more than 50 basis points in the last 10 weeks. 
A close look at the data shows that the general housing market had 
started to recover at the beginning of this year until the subprime 
crisis hit. Then existing housing sales slowed again, and construction 
fell to a halt. To my mind, the credit crunch, rather than psychology, 
poses the greatest risk to the housing market through a simultaneous 
reduction in mortgage lending across the country. It is unlikely that 
we have seen the end of the credit problems given the slow speed of Commentary  131
foreclosures and the amount of leverage embedded in many ABS and 
CDO structures that handicaps new lending going forward. And the 
availability of credit when mortgages are funded by securitization 
rather than banks is something that is much harder for the Fed to 
effectively manage.132  Christopher J. Mayer
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Current as of Quarter 1, 2007
Index = 1: 27-Year Average
Annual cost of ownership calculations are taken from Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 
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Current as of Quarter 1, 2007
Rent data is not available for the Las Vegas MSA
Index = 1: 27-Year Average
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